



BSI Standards Publication

OPC unified architecture

Part 2: Security Model

National foreword

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TECHNICAL REPORT



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OPC UNIFIED ARCHITECTURE –**Part 2: Security Model****FOREWORD**

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IEC TR 62541-2, which is a technical report, has been prepared by subcommittee 65E: Devices and integration in enterprise systems, of IEC technical committee 65: Industrial-process measurement, control and automation.

This third edition cancels and replaces the second edition of IEC TR 62541-2, published in 2016. This edition constitutes a technical revision.

This edition includes the following significant technical changes with respect to the previous edition:

- a) protection-targets definition change;
- b) threat type clarifications;
- c) expanded best practices;

- d) added Websockets;
- e) added Pub/Sub.

The text of this technical report is based on the following documents:

Enquiry draft	Report on voting
65E/679/DTR	65E/703/RVDR

Full information on the voting for the approval of this technical report can be found in the report on voting indicated in the above table.

This publication has been drafted in accordance with the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2.

Throughout this document and the referenced other Parts of the series, certain document conventions are used:

Italics are used to denote a defined term or definition that appears in the “Terms and definition” clause in one of the parts of the series.

Italics are also used to denote the name of a service input or output parameter or the name of a structure or element of a structure that are usually defined in tables.

The italicized terms and names are also often written in camel-case (the practice of writing compound words or phrases in which the elements are joined without spaces, with each element's initial letter capitalized within the compound). For example, the defined term is *AddressSpace* instead of *Address Space*. This makes it easier to understand that there is a single definition for *AddressSpace*, not separate definitions for *Address* and *Space*.

A list of all parts of the IEC 62541 series, published under the general title *OPC Unified Architecture*, can be found on the IEC website.

The committee has decided that the contents of this publication will remain unchanged until the stability date indicated on the IEC web site under "<http://webstore.iec.ch>" in the data related to the specific publication. At this date, the publication will be

- reconfirmed,
- withdrawn,
- replaced by a revised edition, or
- amended.

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OPC UNIFIED ARCHITECTURE –

Part 2: Security Model

1 Scope

This part of IEC 62541 describes the OPC Unified Architecture (OPC UA) security model. It describes the security threats of the physical, hardware, and software environments in which OPC UA is expected to run. It describes how OPC UA relies upon other standards for security. It provides definition of common security terms that are used in this and other parts of the OPC UA specification. It gives an overview of the security features that are specified in other parts of the OPC UA specification. It references services, mappings, and *Profiles* that are specified normatively in other parts of the OPC UA Specification. It provides suggestions or best practice guidelines on implementing security. Any seeming ambiguity between this part and one of the other normative parts does not remove or reduce the requirement specified in the other normative part.

It is important to understand that there are many different aspects of security that have to be addressed when developing applications. However, since OPC UA specifies a communication protocol, the focus is on securing the data exchanged between applications. This does not mean that an application developer can ignore the other aspects of security like protecting persistent data against tampering. It is important that the developers look into all aspects of security and decide how they can be addressed in the application.

This part is directed to readers who will develop OPC UA *Client* or *Server* applications or implement the OPC UA services layer. It is also for end Users that wish to understand the various security features and functionality provided by OPC UA. It also offers some suggestions that can be applied when deploying systems. These suggestions are generic in nature since the details would depend on the actual implementation of the *OPC UA Applications* and the choices made for the site security.

2 Normative references

The following documents are referred to in the text in such a way that some or all of their content constitutes requirements of this document. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.

IEC TR 62541-1, *OPC Unified Architecture – Part 1: Overview and Concepts*

IEC 62541-4, *OPC Unified Architecture – Part 4: Services*

IEC 62541-5, *OPC Unified Architecture – Part 5: Information Model*

IEC 62541-6, *OPC Unified Architecture – Part 6: Mappings*

IEC 62541-7, *OPC Unified Architecture – Part 7: Profiles*

IEC 62541-12, *OPC Unified Architecture – Part 12: Discovery and Global Services*

IEC 62541-14, *OPC Unified Architecture – Part 14: PubSub*

IEC 62351 (all parts), *Power systems management and associated information exchange*